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Abstract. Defenders of the odious debt doctrine, which bars creditors from collecting
sovereign debts that financed the personal consumption of former dictators, argue that
this rule would benefit populations following dictatorships and discourage would-be
dictators from staging coups in the first place. We show that optimism about the doctrine
is based on unrealistic assumptions about the motives and practices of dictators. With
more realistic assumptions, the odious debt doctrine could be beneficial or harmful,
depending on circumstances. Defenders of the doctrine have not made the empirical case
that the net benefits would be positive if the doctrine were incorporated into international
law, and there is ample reason for skepticism that they would be.

The western liberal states have practical and humanitarian interests in preventing
other states from being taken over by dictatorships and in encouraging democratic reform
in existing dictatorships. Dictatorships often mistreat and impoverish their own citizens
and commit atrocities. Dictatorships also produce refugee crises, fight with their
neighbors, and provide havens for terrorists. Because dictatorships rarely enjoy the broad
support of their own citizens, they are vulnerable to insurgencies and civil war.
Yet liberal states have taken an ambivalent attitude toward dictatorships. On the
one hand, governments of liberal states make clear that they disapprove of dictatorships
and usually subject them to diplomatic pressure. Particularly bad dictatorships may be
subject to sanctions of various sorts, including economic sanctions; and some bad and
dangerous dictatorships are subverted or attacked. Recent examples include the invasion
of Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo, the sanctions imposed on Sudan, and the longrunning sanctions on Cuba. In rare instances, dictators are prosecuted for their crimes. On
the other hand, western governments cooperate with many dictatorships. They authorize
trade, including the sale of weapons; they authorize private investment; they even give
foreign aid to the dictatorships. Indeed, cooperation is the more common practice. China,
Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and many other authoritarian states that routinely abuse
their citizens are permitted to join international organizations, enjoy liberal trading
relationships with the western powers, and in some cases receive foreign aid. During the
cold war, the U.S. and its allies supported dictatorships that took a hard line against the
Soviet Union.
The ambivalence reflects the conflicting interests of the Western states. They have
humanitarian and strategic interests in encouraging democracy and respect for human
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rights; but they also have strong strategic interests in trading, entering military alliances
with, and in other ways cooperating with dictatorships, especially powerful dictatorships.
Indeed, even humanitarian reasons can be given for such cooperation; it is often argued
that engagement is more likely to lead to reform than isolation, and in any event it is
often the case that western powers need the assistance of dictatorships in order to perform
humanitarian missions. For example, China and Russia wield vetoes on the Security
Council, so any lawful humanitarian military intervention needs their permission, which
they are likely to withhold if they believe that western states seek to isolate them.
These complexities suggest that liberal states will usually have to take a flexible
approach to dictatorships—constantly adjusting the degree of cooperation or isolation in
response to events. States need to take account not only of liberalizing tendencies, which
they will want to reward; they also have to keep in mind the extent to which a
dictatorship may become more or less important for its strategic interests. A government
that tries to isolate Syria because of its terrorist ties might end up needing to cooperate
with it in order to resolve the conflict in Iraq.3 States also worry that the sanctions that
they impose might fail to dislodge the dictator while imposing hardship on the public—
the opposite of their purpose. The sanctions on Iraq from 1993 to 2003 had just this
effect. It is thus not surprising that empirical studies of sanction regimes suggest that they
usually fail to accomplish the stated ends of the states that imposed the sanctions.4
Frustrated with the limited success of sanction regimes, some scholars and
advocates argue that sanctions should be legalized—that is, sanctions should be required
by international law when certain conditions are satisfied, rather than imposed
episodically on the basis of political considerations. Current interest focuses on the
odious debt doctrine, which provides that a successor regime is not responsible for paying
the debts of a prior regime if those debts were incurred by an authoritarian government
and used to enrich its members rather than to benefit the public.5 The legal status of the
doctrine is controversial but it has many advocates.6
It should be clear that the odious debt doctrine is not meant as an overall solution
to the problem of how to treat dictators. It does not interfere with trade or travel or other
things that dictators might care about; it interferes only with lending. Thus, one puzzle
raised by the doctrine is why lending, rather than trade, should be subject to legal
regulation, and whether there is any point in restricting cooperation along one dimension
3
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while maintaining it along others. The odious debt doctrine also does not address the
benefits of cooperating with dictators; it does excuse a dictator who arrests terrorists at
the request of western governments, or who takes in refugees from a conflict in a
bordering country, or who provides assistance in a humanitarian intervention.
Despite these problems, the odious debt doctrine has been endorsed by a large
group of scholars and advocates. We will argue that this endorsement is premature and
probably unwise. We show that it is unclear whether the doctrine will improve the
welfare of the population that might be subject to a dictatorship. Although a selective
application of the doctrine can improve welfare in principle, it is unlikely that such
selective application would be practicable. If incorporated into international law, there is
a danger that the odious debt doctrine would do more harm than good.
I. The Normative Case for the Odious Debt Doctrine
Defenders of the odious debt doctrine often rest their case on the simple and
apparently morally compelling claim that an impoverished population that has recently
overthrown a dictator should not have to pay sovereign debt incurred by the dictator to
pay for his own lavish personal consumption. But the well-being of the post-dictatorship
population cannot be taken in isolation; one needs to consider the likely impact of the
doctrine on the well-being of the population before the dictator is overthrown and on the
well-being of populations who are never able to escape a dictatorship. To do this, one
needs to take an ex ante perspective, comparing the well-being of affected populations in
the world in which the doctrine exists and the world in which it does not exist.
The conventional ex ante defense of the rule does just this. Suppose creditors
know that they cannot collect if they lend money to a dictator in order to finance private
consumption. Creditors will respond to the rule by declining to make such loans or by
charging a higher interest rate. As a result, dictators will not be able to, or will decide not
to, borrow for private consumption, and more money will be left for the future
generations of the population. As the dictator is just a single person with a lot of money
already, and therefore obtains a small marginal gain from an additional dollar, and as the
future public is poor and thus will value an additional dollar a lot, the restriction on
lending should, by transferring wealth from the dictator to future public, produce a
welfare gain.
Potentially of even greater importance, would-be dictators may be deterred from
taking power if they anticipate that they will not be able to borrow for personal
consumption once they control the government. If so, the odious debt doctrine will, in the
long run, reduce the number of dictatorships and in this way improve the well-being of
populations that would be subject to dictatorships but for the deterrent effect of the
doctrine. Meanwhile, the loss of the lending opportunity to creditors, most of which are
firms with relatively wealthy shareholders, is likely to have a small impact on utility. In
the short run, profits might be somewhat smaller but the international lending market is
highly liquid and investors should be able to find nearly as good opportunities. In the
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long run, lending opportunities will not be reduced because creditors can lend to the
additional states that do not have dictatorships as a result of the odious debt doctrine.
One should observe that this argument in favor of restrictions on lending is no
different from an argument in favor of any other sanctioning regime, and thus whether it
is true or not depends on the basic consideration for and against sanctioning that we
discussed in the Introduction. We think this point is obvious but we mention it because
some commentators might be read to say otherwise.7
II. A Model of the Odious Debt Doctrine
The argument described above is excessively optimistic; it overlooks significant
practical difficulties. To address some of these difficulties, we provide a model of odious
debt financing. We are particularly interested in whether the dictator, who attempts to
stay in power for a long period and to maximize his personal consumption, will borrow
from abroad for short-term consumption or for a longer-term investment. We analyze
how the odious debt doctrine will affect the dictator’s choice and how that, in turn, will
affect the public. The model will demonstrate that while the dictator will prefer the
lending regime without the doctrine, whether the public will benefit from the doctrine is
unclear and depends on complex factors.
A. The Model
There are four periods in the model. At t=1, a potential dictator decides whether to
stage a coup. Although we do not explicitly model the cost of staging a coup, we assume
that it is costly and the dictator’s decision depends on his expected utility from success. If
he comes into power, at t=2, he borrows money from abroad and spends either on private
consumption or on a quasi-public investment. He can also decide not to borrow at all, in
which case he will rely only on the resources provided by the country. Borrowing from
abroad is accompanied by a promise to pay back at t=4. At t=3, the dictator is overthrown
with some positive probability. We assume that it is costly for the public to overthrow the
dictator and the public’s decision depends, in part, on its expected gain from
overthrowing him. At t=4, if the dictator is overthrown at t=3, then a more representative
government, depending on whether the odious debt doctrine is in place, either pays back
the money that was borrowed in t=2 or successfully repudiates it. If the dictator is not
overthrown at t=3, the dictator must pay back the loan he borrowed at t=2. We will
assume that if the odious debt doctrine is not in place, both the representative government
and the dictator will pay back the money at t=4 because they are concerned about their
future borrowing capacity.8
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Suppose at t=2 and t=4, the country generates a cash flow of r>0 per period that
the dictator can extract for his own benefit or (at t=4) the government can use to satisfy
the debt that was borrowed at t=2. At t=2, let’s assume that the dictator can borrow
amount d from abroad. For the sake of simplicity, there is no time discount and the
interest rate that is charged by the competitive international banking industry is 0. Let’s
also assume that the probability (p) of overthrowing the dictator at t=3 is either p1 if the
odious debt doctrine is in place and p2 if not, where both p1 and p2 are strictly between
zero and one. If the dictator does not borrow in t=2, the probability of being overthrown
at t=3 is p0. Finally, the country generates enough cash flow to satisfy the debt at t=4:
r>d.
After the dictator comes into power at t=1, he cares about his expected utility,
given by c2+(1-p)*c4, where c2 and c4 are the amounts of resources the dictator consumes
in periods 2 and 4. The level of consumption will depend on the amount of resources he
extracts from the public, money borrowed from abroad, and the cash flow that is
generated by the quasi-public investment. The public’s utility is given by
u(b2)+p*u(b4)+(1-p)*u(b4’), where b2, b4, are b4’ are the levels of consumption the public
enjoy in period 2, 4 with overthrow, and 4 without overthrow. We assume that if the
dictator takes away $1 from the public, the loss of utility to the public is larger than the
utility the dictator gains, i.e., u’>1. Also, assume that u’ is constant. If the (potential)
dictator does not come into power at t=1, we assume that his utility is zero and the public
consumes the cash flow r in each period: its utility is u(r)+u(r).
1. The Case of No borrowing
Suppose there is no international borrowing. Conditional on being in power, the
dictator will take away the entire cash flow r in t=2 and again in t=4 for his private
consumption. The public will have something for its own consumption only when the
dictator is out of power in period 4. At t=3, the public, by overthrowing the dictator,
expects to gain u(r). Overthrowing the dictator is costly and this will lead to some
probability p0 that determines whether the dictator will be in power. The dictator’s utility,
therefore, is r+(1-p0)*r and the public’s utility is u(0)+p0*u(r). At t=1, a potential dictator
will compare the expected benefit r+(1-p0)*r with the cost of staging a coup and this will
determine the probability of the dictator coming into power: q0.
2. Borrowing for pure consumption
Suppose the dictator is in power and borrows d at t=2 for personal consumption.
Consumption does not generate any future cash flow. How much the international
banking community will charge for this loan will depend on the existence of the odious
debt doctrine. If the subsequent government at t=4 can (and will) repudiate the debt under
the odious debt doctrine, since the banks can recover their lending only under the
dictatorial regime, they will demand, as repayment at t=4, d/(1-p1). If the subsequent
government must pay back the loan, they will demand d.
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Without the odious debt doctrine, the dictator will borrow d at t=2, consume r+d
at t=2 and repay d at t=4 if he is in power. At period 4, he will again extract everything
for his personal consumption. His utility, therefore, is (r+d)+(1-p2)(r-d), which is equal to
r+(1-p2)r+p2*d. The public receives no money at t=2 but is saddled with the obligation of
repayment after the dictator has been overthrown. The public’s utility is u(0)+p2*u(r-d).
If the doctrine is in place, the banks can recover from the dictator only if the dictator is
not overthrown at t=3. The dictator’s utility is (r+d)+(1-p1)(r-d/(1-p1)), which is equal to
r+(1-p1)r. The public enjoys u(0)+p1*u(r). Not surprisingly, the public enjoys a higher
utility level with the odious debt doctrine, and the dictator enjoys higher utility without
the doctrine.
When the odious debt doctrine is not in place, the problem of dictator’s borrowing
from abroad for personal consumption is that it exerts a negative externality onto the
future government, because the future government must bear the burden of repayment.
The difference in the two cases for the dictator is the amount of this externality:
approximately p2*u(d). What the odious debt doctrine does, then, is to make the dictator
internalize this negative externality by paying back more in case he stays in power. In
some cases, the size of the repayment demand will be large enough, i.e., d/(1-p1)>r, to
prevent the dictator from borrowing for personal consumption altogether.
Now it is easy to understand what the potential problem of the odious debt
doctrine is. Because the doctrine causes the dictator to internalize only the negative
externality (by having to pay back more in case he stays in power), any project that has
some positive externality for the public will become less attractive for the dictator. The
banking community does not care about the amount of positive externality that a project
(at t=2) can impose onto the public. It cares only about repayment. We can illustrate this
with the following example.
3. Borrowing for a quasi-public investment
Suppose the dictator can borrow d at t=2 to implement a project. The project
generates a cash flow of x and also a public benefit of u(y) in period 4. We will assume
that the dictator can take the entire x away but not u(y). We can think of x as the
additional cash flow and u(y) as some intangible, consumption benefit that accrues to the
public. For the project to be worthwhile for the dictator, we will assume that x>d and u(y)
to be greater than or equal to 0. As an example, the project might be building some sort of
infrastructure (like drilling an oil well, digging a mine, building a road, constructing a
power station) that generates cash flow that the dictator can grab but also generates some
benefit for the public. We allow for the possibility that the investment only generates
cash flow that the dictator can grab (u(y)=0). Meanwhile, we will assume that the initial
revenue r will be consumed by the dictator.9
Without the odious debt doctrine, the banks will demand d for repayment at t=4.
Conditional on implementing the project, the dictator will enjoy the utility of r+(19

Although the dictator can use the existing resources (r) to finance the project, borrowing from abroad will
be more beneficial for him since it leaves for more his consumption.
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p2)*(r+x-d). At t=2, the dictator will extract the entire r for personal consumption and
borrow d to implement the project. At t=4, once the project generates the cash flow of x,
the dictator takes all of it while paying back the d that was borrowed. The public will
enjoy the utility of u(0)+u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d). At t=2, the public gets no money. But, from
the project the public enjoys the utility of u(y) and also the added benefit of u(x-d) in case
the dictator is overthrown.
With the odious debt doctrine, let’s assume that the international community
cannot tell whether the dictator has spent the borrowed money on a quasi-public project
or on pure personal consumption. After all, the proponent may argue that since the
dictator’s motive for borrowing is for investment that generates more wealth for his own
pocket in the future (especially when u(y)=0), the doctrine should still apply to this type
of spending.10 Now, for borrowing d in t=2, the bank demands d/(1-p1) in t=4 in case the
dictator is not thrown out. The dictator will enjoy the utility of r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)). The
public will enjoy the utility of u(0)+u(y)+p1*u(r+x). The difference from the previous
example is that while the dictator gets to enjoy the cash flow benefit of the project only
with probability (1-p1), he has to bear the entire borrowing cost. The project, through the
odious debt doctrine, generates a positive externality for the public.
4. Choice among investment, consumption and no borrowing
The choice that the dictator faces at t=2 is to either borrow and invest in the
project, borrow for pure personal consumption, or not borrow at all. When the odious
debt doctrine is in place, by not borrowing or borrowing for personal consumption, the
dictator realizes the expected utility of r+(1-p1)*r. The public receives an expected utility
of u(0)+p1*u(r). If he were to borrow to invest in the project, he gets an expected utility
of r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)), while the public receives an expected utility of
u(0)+u(y)+p1*u(x+r). Hence, when the dictator is deciding whether to borrow to invest or
consume, he will borrow to invest only when x-d/(1-p1)>0 or (1-p1)x>d.

No borrowing
Personal consumption
Quasi-public project

With the odious debt doctrine
Dictator’s utility
r+(1-p1)*r
r+(1-p1)*r
r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1))

Public’s utility
u(0)+p1*u(r)
u(0)+p1*u(r)
u(0)+u(y)+p1*u(x+r)

Without the odious debt doctrine, between investing in the project and not
borrowing at all, the dictator will invest. By investing, he realizes the utility of r+(1p2)*(r+x-d), while the public enjoys u(0)+u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d). If he were to borrow for
personal consumption, on the other hand, he gets r+(1-p2)r+p2*d and the public receives
u(0)+p2*u(r-d). Between borrowing to invest and to consume, if (1-p2)(x-d)>p2*d, he will
invest, while if (1-p2)(x-d)<p2*d, he will borrow for personal consumption. The
comparison is between the magnitude of the negative externality he can impose on the
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public for consumption borrowing versus the amount of benefit he receives from
investing in the project.

No borrowing
Personal consumption
Quasi-public project

Without the odious debt doctrine
Dictator’s utility
Public’s utility
r+(1-p2)*r
u(0)+p2*u(r)
r+(1-p2)r+p2*d
u(0)+p2*u(r-d)
r+(1-p2)*(r+x-d)
u(0)+u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d)

What is interesting about this comparison is that, if the doctrine does not affect
the probability of overthrowing the dictator, i.e., if p1=p2=p, the decision of the dictator as
to whether to borrow to invest or borrow to consume does not depend on the regime.
Whether or not the doctrine is in place, the dictator will borrow to invest rather than to
consume if and only if (1-p)x>d. While surprising at first, the logic is intuitive. Consider
first the case with the doctrine. Compared to the case where the dictator borrows for
personal consumption, borrowing for investment provides an additional benefit of (1-p)x
to the dictator while imposing the (debt) cost of d. He bears the full cost of the debt
because the banking community increases the repayment amount, from d to d/(1-p), to
eliminate their risk of no repayment in case the dictator is overthrown.
When the doctrine is not in place, by borrowing for personal consumption, the
dictator is able to impose a negative externality onto the public in case he is overthrown.
The benefit of this to the dictator is p*d. If he decides to borrow for investment,
therefore, he must bear not only the cost of repayment, (1-p)d, but also this forgone
opportunity. So, the full cost of borrowing for investment is d. On the benefit side, he
enjoys the additional cash flow of x only when he is not overthrown. So, the dictator will
decide to invest with the borrowed money if and only if (1-p)x is larger than d, which is
the same as in the case with the doctrine.
What will be different between the two cases, however, is the probability of being
overthrown at t=3 and the probability of a dictator coming into power at t=1. We focus on
the differential probability of being overthrown first. With the doctrine, because the
public has more to gain from overthrowing the dictator, they are more likely to overthrow
than not. Conditional on p, the public’s utility is strictly higher under the regime with the
odious debt doctrine than without. Hence, we can assume that p2<p1 in equilibrium, so
that d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1). Since the dictator now faces a different probability of being able to
stay in power, his decision about whether to borrow to invest or to consume will also be
different. We have to consider three possible cases.11
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provide more incentive to the public to overthrow the dictatorial regime. Our analysis on how the
probabilities are different across the two regimes will not be affected, however.
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Case 1: if x< d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1), under both regimes, the dictator just borrows from
abroad for his personal consumption. The dictator prefers the regime with no odious debt
doctrine, r+(1-p2)r+p*d> r+(1-p1)*r, since, without the doctrine, not only can he impose a
negative externality onto the successor government but also he is more likely to stay in
power at t=4 because the public has a lower incentive to overthrow his government. The
public realizes u(0)+p1*u(r) with the odious debt doctrine and u(0)+p2*u(r-d) without.
The public strictly prefers the imposition of the odious debt doctrine for the same
reasons: they do not want to bear the negative externality imposed by the dictator and
also they are more likely to set up a representative government at t=4. Stepping back
further, given that the dictator earns a higher utility under the regime without the odious
debt doctrine, the dictator is more likely to attempt a coup at t=1 when the odious debt
doctrine is not in place.
Case 2: if d/(1-p2)<d/(1-p1)<x, the dictator makes the quasi-public investment
under both regimes. The dictator realizes a higher expected utility under the regime
without the odious debt doctrine: r+(1-p2)*(r+x-d)> r+(1-p1)(r+x-d/(1-p1)). This is
because (1) the dictator does not need to bear the full cost of debt and (2) he is more
likely to stay in power without the odious debt doctrine. For the public, since p1>p2 and
x+r>x+r-d, the public, again, strictly prefers the regime with the odious debt doctrine.
They receive the positive externality from the dictator’s investment without having the
bear the debt cost and are more likely to overthrow the dictator at t=3. Since the dictator
realizes a higher expected utility without the odious debt doctrine, the probability of coup
at t=1 will be higher without the doctrine.
Case 3: when d/(1-p2)<x<d/(1-p1), the dictator implements the quasi-public
project when there is no odious debt doctrine but borrows for personal consumption when
the doctrine is in place. The dictator expects utility of r+(1-p2)*(r+x-d) without the
doctrine and r+(1-p1)*r with the doctrine. Since p1>p2 and x-d>0, the dictator prefers the
regime with no odious debt doctrine: r+(1-p2)*(r+x-d)> r+(1- p1)*r. Without the doctrine,
he can get the benefit of the investment and is less likely to be overthrown. The public’s
relative utility, on the other hand, is ambiguous. With the doctrine, the public earns u(0)+
p1*u(r), whereas without, it earns u(0)+u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d). Even if we assume that u(y)=0,
the public’s utility might be lower with the doctrine because it does not receive the
benefit of the quasi-public investment undertaken by the dictator. While p1>p2, u(r+xd)>u(r). Particularly, if u(y)>0, the public is more likely to be worse off with the doctrine
than without. However, since the dictator realizes a higher utility with no odious debt
doctrine, the dictator is more likely to stage a coup at t=1.
We can make a few generalizations from the examples. First, the dictator will
always prefer the regime with no odious debt doctrine. The reason is that it allows him to
stay in power longer and gives him a higher expected utility from being in power, either
through additional consumption that imposes a negative externality onto the public or
through quasi-public investment. Thus, the odious debt doctrine makes the coup at t=1
less likely.
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Second, on average, the odious debt doctrine makes it more difficult for the
dictator to implement the quasi-public project. The dictator, instead, prefers to borrow for
personal consumption. When the doctrine is in place, the dictator decides to implement
the project only in the second case.
Third, it is unclear whether the doctrine benefits the public. Conditional on the
investment being made or not, the doctrine increases the public’s utility by (1) decreasing
the probability that the dictator will stay in power; (2) decreasing the probability that a
would-be dictator will come to power; and (3) either eliminating the negative externality
imposed by the dictator’s consumption or allowing the public to better enjoy the positive
externality from the dictator’s quasi-public investment. However, because the dictator is
less likely to make the quasi-public investment under the doctrine, the public is less likely
to be able to enjoy the fruits of such investment. Especially when u(y) is large, the loss of
(potential) benefit to the public will outweigh the gains.
B. Empirical Premises
In principle, the odious debt doctrine could be selectively applied to avoid
harming the public. Suppose we are in case 3, where the dictator fails to make the quasipublic investment with the doctrine. If the public’s benefit from the investment is large,
the doctrine should not be imposed, whereas if small, it should. The determination should
be based primarily on two factors: the size of the benefit, both tangible and intangible, to
the public (u(y) and u(x-d)) and the differential probability of overthrowing the dictatorial
regime (p1 versus p2). If p1*u(r)>u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d), the doctrine should be imposed;
otherwise, the doctrine should not be imposed.
We doubt that decisionmakers can reliably perform these calculations on a case
by case basis, and suspect that, in an aggregate sense, the inequality does not hold. Let us
consider the empirical premises of this inequality.
1. The doctrine will deter borrowing for personal consumption without interfering
excessively with borrowing for quasi-public investment that benefits the public
Consider, first, the variable y—the benefit that the public receives from projects.
Some of the literature implies that dictators frequently borrow money for the express
purpose of building themselves unnecessary palaces. However, dictators generally
become wealthy by taking kickbacks on public contracts and similar forms of corruption.
They build roads, airports, power plants, dams, and ports, and, although they skim off
profits, the resulting infrastructure benefits the public, at least a little.12 For example, a
government might use a loan to build a bridge or some other public project but would
demand kickbacks from the contractor. If a $10 million loan is used to build a $9 million
bridge, with government ministers skimming of the extra $1 million, is this an odious
debt? If so, the doctrine discourages an investment that could benefit the public; if not,
the doctrine will have little effect on actual behavior. No doubt the dictators prefer this
form of corruption because it gives them some political cover but, by the same token, this
12
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form of corruption is not as bad as borrowing for personal consumption alone. Although
there are well-known cases of prestige projects that yielded no gain to the public, most
serious defenders of the odious debt doctrine do not argue that dictatorial governments
should be deprived of credit for legitimate projects, even if they turn out to be failures.
During the past half century, numerous dictatorial regimes borrowed money from
foreign creditors and made investments in infrastructure and industry, investments that
have paid off for future generations. Chile under Pinochet, South Korea under Park, and
Singapore under Lee, are classic development success stories. China’s authoritarian
regime has borrowed tremendous sums, and currently China is enjoying rapid economic
growth. Even the authoritarian regimes that have been less successful in promoting
economic growth cannot, in most cases, be accused of using foreign debt for personal
consumption. The Latin American dictatorships, for example, did not squander their
loans on consumption; they invested poorly. And even the worst kleptocratic dictators in
Africa did not consume all of their loans. They used them mainly to pay off political
supporters and finance the army. All regimes must, to some extent, make transfer
payments in order to keep domestic peace, and to finance the army in order to protect the
country from domestic unrest and foreign invasion; these types of payments are quasipublic investments because the public benefits from peace and domestic order.
Even more troublesome, straightforward borrowing for personal consumption is
not necessarily harmful to the public. One cannot determine whether a particular debt is
odious in isolation. Governments obtain funds from tax receipts and loans. There is no
sense in which the two sources can be kept separate from each other. Thus, a dictator can
evade the odious debt doctrine by arbitrarily designating bank loans as the source for
public projects and tax revenue as the source for the dictator’s consumption. The only
way that the doctrine could limit borrowing would be if the dictator seeks to spend more
money on himself than he could obtain from tax revenues alone. However, in nearly all
realistic cases extremely greedy dictators can satisfy themselves from the tax revenues.
By contrast, the original example of odious debt was a rare instance where borrowed
funds went directly into the pocket of the dictator.13
The main effect of the odious debt doctrine is to encourage dictators to be shortsighted. Because they are less likely to collect the return on investment, they are less
likely to invest. If the odious debt doctrine increases the probability of being overthrown
by a great enough amount, the dictator will borrow in order to consume rather than
borrow in order to invest. In the limiting case, he will not invest at all. Although the
public does not have to repay the debt for his consumption, it will also suffer from lower
economic growth because he did not invest.
2. The doctrine will substantially increase the probability that the public will overthrow a
dictator and replace him with a representative government

13
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One might think that an argument in favor of the odious debt doctrine would be
that it increases the probability that the public will overthrow the dictator by offering the
public debt relief if the attempt to overthrow succeeds. However, as we explained above,
this argument ignores the way that the prospects of being overthrown affects the
incentives of the dictator and hence public welfare. If the odious debt doctrine increases
the risk of being overthrown, the dictator has less incentive to make quasi-public
investments.
Ironically, the case for the odious debt doctrine is strongest if the doctrine has no
effect on the probability that the dictator will be overthrown. If it has no effect, then the
dictator’s choice between investing and consuming will not be affected by whether the
doctrine is in place. Thus, the only effect of the doctrine would be to release the public
from debt if the overthrow occurs—a straightforward utility gain.
One might argue that this is in fact the case. Overthrowing a dictator is dangerous
and risky, and the public is subject to a collective action problem. In practice, the
question for members of the public is whether to throw their support behind opponents of
the government. The public can do so by engaging in strikes, protesting in the streets, and
so forth. But these are highly costly actions—dictators typically react to them by torturing
and murdering opponents—and so the incentive to free ride will be high. And the public
might expect that the opponents, when in power, will be no better than the dictator.
However, we are skeptical that the odious debt doctrine would have no effect on
the probability of the dictator being overthrown. It is true that overthrowing a dictator is
risky, but this is true whether or not the doctrine is in place. Given the background risks,
debt release increases the reward. The doctrine ensures that the public has much to gain
from the overthrown—debt relief—and the worse the dictator, the greater the benefit of
overthrowing him. And typically revolutions against dictators are led by political
entrepreneurs who will internalize some of the gains.
3. The doctrine will substantially reduce the probability that would-be dictators will seek
power
While this premise might be correct, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the odious debt doctrine will unambiguously benefit the public. Suppose, for the sake
of argument, that having a representative government is always better than having a
dictatorial regime regardless of the dictator’s choice between investment and
consumption: u(r)+u(r) is larger than both p1*u(r) and u(y)+p2*u(r+x-d). We might think
that if would-be dictators are less likely to seek power because of the doctrine, the public
will also be more likely to overthrow the authoritarian government with the doctrine than
without.
If the odious debt doctrine makes the dictator more short-sighted and less likely to
make quasi-public investment, however, while the probability that a dictator comes into
power is lower, conditional on having a dictator the public is also worse off. In other
words, although the public is less likely to face a dictator, in case it does its condition
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may be more miserable. The net welfare effect of the doctrine, therefore, will depend on
how much the public will be worse off under a dictatorial regime and how much less
likely would-be dictators will seek power because of the doctrine.
4. The doctrine will, if applied correctly, reduce the debt burdens of representative
governments
It is not clear representative governments can afford to repudiate even odious
debts. A government that repudiates debts, even with legal sanction, may be adjudged a
high credit risk and refused further loans, or only at a high rate of interest. Thus, it is
quite possible that the odious debt doctrine would have no effect.
Why might this be the case? Suppose that there is some uncertainty about whether
an existing government’s loans will be subsequently treated as odious debt. Creditors
might fear that although the government is nominally a representative government, a later
decisionmaker will determine that the representative institutions were nominal only and
power was exercised behind the scenes by a dictator. Suppose further that there is
uncertainty as to whether a future decisionmaker will decide that loan proceeds were used
to pay for a dictator’s consumption or for a public project. Creditors will be unwilling to
lend to this government.
Now, if the government seeks to maintain its creditworthiness, one way it can do
so is by repaying the odious debts of the prior government. This will signal to creditors
that future governments will behave in the same way, and this will resolve its concerns
about lending to it.
One solution to this problem is to stipulate that the odious debt doctrine will apply
to loans only after an international institution or important nations designate a regime as
being odious.14 However, this would significantly weaken the odious debt doctrine, since
international agreement on these matters is difficult to achieve for reasons that will be
discussed in Part III, below.
C. A Comparison to Jayachandran & Kremer
Jayachandran & Kremer provides a defense for the odious doctrine.15 In their
model, as in ours, a would-be dictator decides whether to seize power, and is more likely
to do so if his utility in power will be higher. The government (dictator or not) decides
whether to allocate resources to a productive activity (fruit-growing, in their example) or
to activity that mainly benefits the government (palace-building). The government can
also authorize international trade in fruit, and can buy the inputs (marble) for palaces
from foreign firms. Citizens are paid a wage whether they build palaces or harvest fruit,
but if resources are devoted to fruit-growing, they also benefit from the consumption of
fruit. Productivity varies across time, and governments can borrow during productive
years so that they will have greater funds during unproductive years.
14
15
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Good governments will borrow in order to smooth the consumption of citizens
across time: that is, they borrow from foreign creditors during the unproductive year, use
the money to buy fruit for citizens, and then pay back the loan during the productive year,
when the excess harvest is sold internationally. Bad governments will borrow in order to
ensure palace production during unproductive years; they leave office and subsequent
populations must repay the loan.
In the absence of the odious debt doctrine, there is a reputational equilibrium
where all creditors are repaid, whether or not the debt was odious, because they have a
credible threat to sue a government that defaults. If a government defaults, creditors bring
suit in a country in which the government has assets. Domestic and international law
provides that, indeed, the assets of the debtor country can be seized by creditors. The
odious debt doctrine provides that the creditors cannot seize the assets of the debtor in the
creditors’ countries if the debtor is a successor government to a dictatorship that used the
borrowed funds to enrich the rulers rather than to benefit the public.
Under these assumptions, Jayachandran & Kremer show that the odious debt
doctrine improves the welfare of the affected population. Specifically, the doctrine
destroys the reputational equilibrium in which the successor government voluntarily
repays the odious debt that is incurred by the previous dictatorial regime. In equilibrium,
creditors lend to nonodious governments and refuse to lend to dictators, and this reduces
the incentive of would-be dictators to take power in the first place. The reduced
probability of a dictator benefits the public. And even if dictators come to power, they are
prevented from borrowing money to build palaces, and so cannot force a future
generation to pay interest on a loan that does not benefit the public.
Jayachandran & Kremer’s model differs from ours in three main ways. First, they
do not permit the dictator to make a quasi-public investment. Dictators can only
consume, that is, build a palace at the expense of growing fruit, with the borrowed
money. As a result, dictators’ activity is unambiguously bad. As we saw above, this
assumption is unrealistic. Dictators build roads to transport troops that the public can use
as well. Dictators build better mechanisms to extract natural resources that benefit later
generations. Dictators fight insurgents who injure civilians as well as threatening the
security of the dictatorship. Thus, Jayachandran & Kremer’s model is biased in favor of
shutting off credit. They acknowledge that the odious debt doctrine is only attractive if it
is “applied against regimes that are borrowing against the people’s interests,”16 but they
fail to acknowledge that the assumption about the absence of quasi-public investments is
unrealistic.
Second, Jayachandran & Kremer assume that the dictator is always overthrown
after one period: the probability of being overthrown is 1. This assumption also biases the
dictator’s incentives in favor of short-term consumption rather than long-term investment
because the dictator cannot enjoy any of the returns from the investment. In our model,
the dictator has only a risk of being overthrown. If he invests, he has a chance of
16
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obtaining a return, and that return motivates the dictator’s investment. In our model, the
sole reason the dictator would want to invest in a project is to be able to build an even
bigger palace tomorrow. But, if the dictator is thrown out before the palace is built, the
public may be able to enjoy the returns on that investment. Furthermore, if the investment
itself has some benefit to the public that the dictator cannot capture, u(y)>0, trying to
provide incentive to the dictator to favor that quasi-public investment may be beneficial
to the public.
Third, Jayachandran & Kremer focus on comparing loan and trade sanctions,
which we do not explicitly analyze. Jayachandran & Kremer argue that the historic
weakness of trade sanctions should not discourage us from adopting a system of loan
sanctions because their model shows that loan sanctions are more likely to work, and
have better welfare properties than trade sanctions do. However, this argument is
problematic.
Jayachandran & Kremer assume that loan sanctions are enforceable because
creditors can collect only in one or a limited number of countries, whereas odious
governments can trade with people in any state.17 Thus, the collective action problem in
enforcing trade sanctions is greater than the collective action problem in enforcing loan
sanctions. This claim is important for Jayachandran & Kremer because they acknowledge
that trade sanctions have been unsatisfactory.18 The problem with this argument is that
governments can choose not to place assets in, or can choose to withdraw assets from,
countries that will not make them available to creditors if the governments default. Thus,
if the U.S. and the EU countries adopted the odious debt doctrine, then new dictatorships
would remove their assets from these countries and place them in other countries, which
would be happy to take them in return for a fee or other diplomatic benefits. Western
investors could easily invest in firms operating in those countries which in turn would
lend to the odious dictators. The collective action problem is identical to that in the trade
area, unless only a small number of countries can be trusted to hold assets and dispose of
them properly. This is unlikely, and in any event similar limitations apply to trade—for
example, only certain countries are reliable suppliers of marble, etc.
In addition, the superior welfare benefits of loan sanctions are also driven by an
assumption that the dictator will not respond to loan sanctions by selling more
nonrenewable resources to the international market. Jayachandran & Kremer admit as
much in a footnote,19 but do not acknowledge the importance of this fact. History shows
that odious regimes typically sell nonrenewable resources such as oil (Nigeria), diamonds
(Sierra Leone), etc. If a dictatorial regime cannot borrow because of the odious debt
doctrine, the regime might attempt to extract and sell inefficiently large quantities of
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nonrenewable natural resources to build a palace whereas with a trade sanction but no
loan sanction, there may be less depletion, benefiting the future population.
Our view is that there is no inherent reason to think loan sanctions are superior to
trade sanctions. If loan sanctions are applied routinely, then states will withdraw assets
from the states in which they would otherwise store the assets. There may be limits on the
extent to which states can do this, but there is also no reason to think that depriving
dictatorships of places to store assets is any more or less effective a type of sanction as
other forms of diplomatic pressure or use of resources (such as withdrawal of foreign
aid).
III. A Note on External Benefits from Cooperating with Dictators
Foreign powers, including western powers, have frequently cooperated with
dictators rather than isolating them. Cooperation has had many motivations. First, many
dictators preside over long-suffering populations. In many instances, a dictator is the
cause of the population’s suffering but in many other cases he is not. A western
government that seeks to aid a population wrecked by famine, drought, disease, economic
distress, ethnic conflict, and so forth, almost always must work through the government.
Authoritarian governments frequently condition access to the populations on payments to
the government—or simply structure or control the aid distribution in a way that ensures
that they receive a piece of it. Donors face a difficult choice, and many rationally bribe
the dictator, or tolerate kickbacks and other forms of corruption that benefit the dictator,
so that he will allow them to help his population.
Second, many dictators control states that have strategic value or that are simply
too important to ignore. During the cold war, the U.S. and other western powers
frequently felt that they had to support dictators in order to limit the spread of Soviet
influence.20 Today, the U.S. needs dictators to help track down terrorists, control drug
smugglers, resolve conflicts, and provide military bases. Dictators must always be bribed,
in cash or in kind, for their support.
There are many ways that a western government can bribe dictators. It can give
them cash payments, and this is done frequently. It can give them technical assistance or
military support. It can offer favorable terms of trade. And it can offer credit or access to
credit. Obviously, offering credit is inconsistent with the odious debt rule. But it would
be odd to deny credit under the odious debt rule while engaging in the other types of
transfers. As we have seen, isolating dictators is frequently not a viable strategy—
because it just leads to greater suffering for the population or interferes with other
important strategic interests. As long as this is the case, there is no reason to single out
credit for restriction.
The larger point is that international relations are fluid and governments need
flexibility to deal with dictators. One could at least imagine a legal regime that required
20
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isolation of dictators; if states stuck by it, at least it would have a meaningful effect. Or
one could continue with the current regime, under which pressure is exerted in an
episodic fashion, and mainly against states that have nothing to offer. But a regime that
singles out credit while preserving all the other forms of cooperation, including aid,
makes no sense at all.
The need for flexibility in regulating access to credit can be seen by comparing
loan sanctions with trade sanctions. Hufbauer and his coauthors’ empirical survey
suggested that trade sanctions tend to work only when certain conditions are satisfied: (1)
the target must be relatively weak, and the goals must be relatively limited: (2) more
states participate; (3) the target must be an ally or have some friendly relationship with
the state that imposes the sanctions; (4) the sanctions must be applied quickly rather than
incrementally; (5) and the sanctions cannot be too costly for the sanctioning country.21 If
this is true for trade, it is surely true for loan sanctions. But because the odious debt
doctrine does not incorporate these factors—and how could one have a legal rule that is
applied only against the weak?—it is not likely to work as intended.
A final problem is that efforts to pressure dictators can be undermined by
geopolitical rivalries. For example, current western efforts to pressure Sudan to halt the
genocide in Darfur are being undermined by the China, which purchases Sudanese oil
and seeks to enhance its influence in Africa. Rivalries of this kind have been a common
problem for trade sanctions and are likely to be a problem for loan sanctions as well. The
frequent lack of international agreement about whether a dictator should be pressured or
not provides grounds for skepticism about Jayachandran and Kremer’s proposal that an
international organization have the authority to declare when a regime is officially
odious, as does historical experience with such institutions, which tend to be controlled
by the states that fund them.22
Conclusion
Loan sanctions pressure dictators to give up power and may deter would-be
dictators from taking power in the first place, but they also harm the dictatorship’s public
when dictators are not deterred and interfere with diplomatic efforts to obtain cooperation
from dictators in matters of general interest. The odious debt doctrine as currently
formulated and defended does not take account of all morally relevant factors.
The traditional backward-looking defense of the odious debt doctrine, which
suggests that the doctrine is costless because it releases a suffering population from an
unjust debt, is seriously incomplete. Our model makes clear that because the dictator
controls the government, the doctrine necessarily harms the public if it is to affect the
21
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incentives of the dictator. Although in specific cases the benefits of loan sanctions may
exceed the costs, the defenders of the doctrine have not made the empirical case that the
net benefits are sufficiently high in the aggregate as to warrant routine application of loan
sanctions to odious dictators. In the absence of such a showing, there is no reason to think
that the odious debt doctrine would be a desirable rule of international law.
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